Jamaat-e-Islami & Muslim Brotherhood ideology

       JI and MB and ideology

What is the resemblance/connection between Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat e Islami?What are the core teachings of Jama’at e Islami? Is there an in-built tendency of militancy in the Jamaat e Islami ideology?

The questions raised are interrelated and have overlapping answers. The issue is multifaceted and
multidimensional. There are currents and crosscurrents running under the surface. Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab does not agree with many theological discourses of Ibn e Taimiya and on many points enters a caveat. But his neo Kharijite version is same as that of Ibn e Taimiya, which is invoked by Wahhabis of today. The Saudi Govt. nevertheless follows Wahhabi theology and works for the advancement of Wahhabism. Similarly the concept of modern day Jahiliyya is common between Maududi of Pakistan and Syed Qutub of Egypt. Maududi does not believe in State Nationhood and yet works within the state, without giving up his world view of Modern Jahiliyya and pan-Islamism. Ahrar and Maududi were and continue to be at daggers drawn and yet they worked together in 1953 violent agitation. There are other such parallels and intersections. In short Militant organizations, political Islam and various other organizations, with variant sectarian theological moorings, converge at a point and work for a common militant fundamentalist agenda. It is this converging point that we are trying to determine and understand.

Motivating ideology—worldwide context

Extensive research has been carried out in recent years to trace the roots of extremism and violence in some Islamic organisations and movements. Abdul Wahhab’s movement has been traced to Ibn e Taimiya, who was also the favorite of Maududi. Ibn e Taimiya propounded the thought that armed Jihad is permissible even against Muslim rulers and societies which do not follow the Islamic law. Jama’at’s ideological affinity is with Wahhabi Sunnis, Jama’at’s international activities are intertwined with Rabeta Alam e Islami, based in Riyadh with various organizations in Medina and Morocco.

“The idea that Jahiliyya was not a bygone era but a current condition connects Qutub to both Wahhabism and Maududi. There is no question that Maududi influenced Qutub: He had shepherded the Pakistani author’s works to publication in Arabic translation.”⁽⁵⁾

Rasheed Raza of Egypt is said to have rediscovered Ibn e Taimiya. The present day fundamentalists invoke Ibn e Taimiya. Ibn e Taimiya had justified war against Mongols who had converted to Islam. Ibn e Taimiya emphasized that Mongols did not apply Muslim Sharia Law and followed their own customary laws. Ibn e Taimiya condemned the Mongols as worst than Khawarij (i.e. Kharijis) and declared that it was obligation of every good Muslim to fight against them.⁽⁶⁾

“Ibn e Taimiya put his anti-Mongol theology in such general and abstract terms that present day rulers in Arab world can equally be regarded as apostates according to the norms which he created for the Mongols^.”(7)

“Ibn e Taimiya’s condemnation of Mongols was dictated by particular military circumstances of the Mamlook—Mongol wars of the time.” ⁽⁸⁾

“Many modern Muslims prefer to regard this condemnation as generally applicable and valid for all places and times”⁽⁹⁾

“Rasheed Raza and Hassan al Bann’a the founder of Muslim Brotherhood shared the same line of reasoning. “it is with Hassan al Bann’a that professional violence became part and parcel of the movement, we now call Islamic Fundamentalism”⁽¹⁰⁾

“Ibn e Taimiya departed from the classical definition of Jihad “by recognizing the possibility of a Jihad against “heretical” and “deviant” muslims within dar ul Islam”⁽¹¹⁾

“He therefore legitimated Jihad against anyone who refused to abide by Islamic law or revolted against the true Muslim authorities. In his opinion the Mongol rulers were clearly at fault on both counts because they had overthrown the Abbasside Caliphate and had favored their own customary law over Islamic law once in power”⁽¹²⁾

Ibn e Taimiya’s reading of the Qura’n, Sunnah and early Islamic history was far more militant.⁽¹³⁾

The most striking parallel between the modern fundamentalists and the ancient Khwarij is the belief of both groups that whoever does not live by God’s Laws is an un-believer and thus excluded from the community. Exclusion from the Islamic Ummah implies being sentenced to death.”⁽¹⁴⁾

“The Neo Kharijite nature of Wahabism makes it intolerant of all other forms”⁽¹⁵⁾

Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab was acting “under the sign of an essentially Neo Kharijite version of Islam. Although he invoked Ibn e Tamiya, he had reservations about him.⁽¹⁶⁾

Syed Qutab was to become the main Ideologue of modern Muslim Fundamentalism. Out of the ruins of Afghani Movement and with the help of Ibn e Taimiya’s war ideology, he created a coherent ideology, which has shown itself to inspire many people to face their death calmly for the sake of Islam and to kill in its name”⁽¹⁷⁾

Syed Qutab’s writings “transformed the fundamentalist Muslims from pious civilians into self-conscious conscript soldiers having no choice but to make war against the enemies of Islam.”⁽¹⁸⁾

Syed Qutub’s concept of present day Jahiliyya as anti-Islamic, vicious and wicked implying apostasy and as a consequence death penalty is so completely shared with Maududi of Pakistan that it is difficult to make out who borrowed from whom.

“Maududi’s Ideology stems from a dialectical concept of history. It opposes Islam to all that is ‘non Islam’ and the struggle between the two must inevitably culminate in an Islamic revolution and the creation of an Islamic state, which will initiate in society large scale reforms leading to utopian Islamic order”⁽¹⁹⁾

Speaking of Syed Qutab and Maulana Maudidi, a Jama’at Islami activist, Khalil Hamedi has quoted an Egyptian magazine giving some detail of the trial of Syed Qutab, before the military tribunal. Referring to his militant views the tribunal asked Syed Qutab, “Did you not copy these thoughts from the writings of Maududi.” Syed Qutub replied, “I have benefited from the books of Maududi.” The tribunal again asked. “What is the difference between your movement and Maududi’s movement”, Syed Qutub Replied, “No difference.” ⁽²⁰⁾

Maududi’s published work encouraging violence

There is abundant material in the published work of Maududi, which establishes violence as one of the basic components of Maududi’s Ideology. The books Al Jihad Fil Islam, Haqeeqat e Jihad, Murtad ki saza Islami Qanun  mein and other books published during his lifetime provide ample testimony to that effect. In his own words Jama’at Islami,

“Is not a missionary organization or a body of preachers or evangelists, but an organization of God’s troopers.”⁽²¹⁾

Maududi not only believes in use of force and violence but also sanctifies and glorifies it with reference to Quran and Sunnah and attributes this mindset to the normative practice of the Holy Prophet (PBUH).

He seeks to assure his readers that,

“This was the policy which was adopted by the Prophet and his rightly guided Caliphs. Arabia, where the Muslim Party was first formed, was the first to be put down. After this, the Prophetsa sent invitations to all neighboring countries, but did not wait to see whether these invitations were accepted. As soon as he acquired power, he started the conflict with the Roman Empire. Abu Bakr became the leader of the Party after the Prophetsa and attacked both the Roman and Persian Empires and Umar finally won the war.”⁽²⁶⁾

Significantly he uses the word “Muslim Party”, very much like “Communist Party”. The word “party” here is not our translation. Maududi has used this word in his Urdu text. Ummah Has thus been reduced to the status of a political party. Elsewhere Maududi says, “the other word the Qura’n has used for party is Ummah.” ⁽²⁷⁾ No wonder his biographers have mentioned Marxist influence in the formative period of his life. In formulating his Ideology, Maududi has even distorted history.

Justifying his methods Maududi argues,

“It is not possible that they [the enemies of Islam] would sacrifice their interests in the face of persuasion and reasoning. All that one can do is to acquire political power11 and force them to stop their mischief.” “Anyone who wants to uproot mischief and disorder from this world and wants to reform mankind should realize that he cannot do so by mere sermonizing and counseling. It is useless. He should rise against the government of false principles; he should seize power, remove the wrongdoers from the seat of authority and set up a government based on sound principles and just administration.”⁽²⁸⁾

Quoting Maududi, Vali Nasar says:

“In effect, the less than fully committed Muslims, who did not abide by Maududi’s conception of theDin were depicted as apostates.”⁽²⁹⁾

And that,

“All Muslim Residents in countries where the Islamic revolution is to take place should be given notice that they have discarded their faith……. They should declare themselves to be non-muslims……….. those who are Muslims because they were born to a Muslim family……….. must be subjected to Islamic law and compelled to observe the Faraiz and Wajibaat (the obligatory religious works)”⁽³⁰⁾

Maududi can very well see the consequences of his methods and provides his own solutions:

“Whenever the death penalty for apostasy is enforced in a new Islamic state, then Muslims are kept within Islam’s fold. But there is a danger that a large number of hypocrites will live alongside them. They will always pose a danger of treason.”⁽³¹⁾

“My solution to the problem is this. That whenever an Islamic revolution takes place, all non-practicing Muslims should, within one year, declare their turning away from Islam and get out of Muslim society. After one year all born Muslims will be considered Muslim. All Islamic laws will be enforced upon them. They will be forced to practice all the Faraiz and Wajibaat of their religion and, if anyone then wishes to leave Islam, he will be executed. Every effort will be made to save as many people as possible from falling into the lap of Kufr. But those who cannot be saved will be reluctantly separated from society forever [executed]. After this purification Islamic society will start afresh with Muslims who have decided voluntarily to remain Muslims.”⁽³²⁾

He goes on to say,

“There are only two methods of dealing with an apostate. Either make him an outlaw by depriving him of his citizenship and allowing him mere existence, or end his life. The first method is definitely more severe than the second, because he exists in a state in which ‘he neither lives nor dies.’ Killing him is preferable. That way both his agony and the agony of the society are brought to an end simultaneously.”⁽³³⁾

“Islam does not want to bring about this revolution in one country, or a few countries. It wants to spread it to the entire world. Although it is the duty of the ‘Muslim Party’ to bring this revolution first to its own nation, its ultimate goal is world revolution.”⁽³⁴⁾

What about other religions in a Muslim state? Maududi says,

“The execution of apostates has already decided the issue. Since we do not allow any Muslim to embrace any other religion, the question of allowing other religions to open their missions and propagate their faiths within our boundaries does not arise. We cannot tolerate it.”⁽³⁵⁾

“Islam can never tolerate that false religions should spread in the world. How can the missionaries of false religions be given a license to spread falsehood and attract others to the fire towards which they themselves are advancing.”⁽³⁶⁾

The Reality of the Soft Image:

Though Maududi and his Jama’at e Islami may have held out different versions, they are only tactical maneuvers. The ideology has never undergone any change and violence and the promise of large scale blood bath remains as a part of his ideology. Jama’at e Islami has worked hard to present and project a soft image of the Jama’at to the world. It has been argued and lately with some measure of success and persuasion that Maududi perhaps did not support violence. This is not correct. His basic thesis about Islam, Islamic state and Islamic revolution contradicts such supposition. This can be shown from his published work and from the course adopted by Jama’at e Islami at crucial stages. The world view of Maulana Maududi, his ideology and thought had

“taken shape by the time he moved to Pakistan. All subsequent amendments to Jama’at’s Ideology pertained to politics rather than Ideology”⁽³⁷⁾

Vali Nasr seems to have been persuaded that Maududi did not favor violent revolution

“Maududi believed that religion’s success depended on controlling the centers of power”…… “A change in the political setup was therefore central to Maududi’s program of action. The pace and breadth of this change and the manner in which the logic of Maududi’s arguments have been reflected in Jama’at’s praxis are open to question.”⁽³⁸⁾

Vali Nasar quoting Maududi himself holds a view that,

“Maududi’s program did indeed sound revolutionary in intent and possibly Marxist in origin when he wrote in The process of Islamic revolution ‘Islam is a revolutionary ideology and a revolutionary practice, which aims at destroying the social order of the world, totally rebuilding it from scratch…… and Jihad denotes the revolutionary struggle.”⁽³⁹⁾

However Vali Nasar did notice that:

 “revolution had no clear cut definition. But was one of the parcel of slogans and shibboleths that served the purpose”⁽⁴⁰⁾

“the Party’s ideology is at odds with its political program. It continues to harp on the theme of Islamic revolution, although it operates within the bounds of political process. In addition it views revolution as a top down process.”… “Revolution is not a means of articulating popular demand but of defining a political struggle against the secular state. Islamic revolution in Jama’at’s rhetoric is not the battle cry of the masses but an elitist crusade aimed at appropriating the state”⁽⁴¹⁾

Significantly in all this discussion the original work in his magnum opus Al Jihad fil Islam and other foundational works find no mention. Vali Nasar has commented,

“for Maududi Politics was as much shaped in the image of ideology as ideology was shaped by the needs of politics, hence despite Maududi’s clear logic and systematic argumentation the concepts and goals of the Islamic state had produced confusing directives to Jama’at”⁽⁴²⁾.

Some of the Jama’at’s leaders notably Syed Assad Gilani, the Ameer of Lahore “Favor the Iranian Model. Gilani believes that Maududi’s Ideas should be reinterpreted to allow the Jama’at to pursue real revolution.”⁽⁴³⁾

Historically seen through its praxis, Jama’at e Islami,

“was not averse to using the coercive power of the masses or of the state to promote its programme. Two incidents have been cited as evidence for this. The first was the role of Maududi and the Jama’at in the Anti-Ahmadiyya Disturbances in 1953 and the second was Jama’at’s collaboration with the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan in 1971.”⁽⁴⁴⁾

“the activity of Jama’at had definitely established it as a party not loathed to utilized force when force was available.”⁽⁴⁵⁾

Speaking of Jama’ats temptation to take recourse to violence, Fredrick Grare writes

“the jama’at or more precisely its student branch, the Islami Jamiat e Tulaba, which unleashed terror on university campuses at one time is also tempted to take recourse to such (violent) means”⁽⁴⁶⁾

“The participation of the Jama’at in various conflicts and its collaboration with the army explains undoubtedly, this restricted use of violence.”⁽⁴⁷⁾

“it organized the sinister, Al-Badar militia composed mostly  of the students of the Jama’at, the Islamic Chatro Shangho, which was equipped by the Pakistan Army.⁽⁴⁸⁾

Saudi Influence;

Saudi Arabia financed establishment of various Jama’at e Islami off shoots—funds flow to Jama’at has also come through the student wing.⁽⁴⁹⁾ Saudi patronage has probably contributed much more over the years in sustaining the Ulama, their reformist endeavors and their religio-political activism.⁽⁵⁰⁾ Saudi Arabia finances, wholly or partially, more than 1500 mosques and 200 Islamic centers throughout the world.⁽⁵¹⁾  Saudi patronage is amply reflected in the carrier of Abul Hassan Nadvi and the rise of Nadvat-ul-Ulama as one of the largest institutions of Islamic learning in South Asia.⁽⁵²⁾ Among other ventures, support for Ahl-e-Hadith institutions in India and Pakistan Jamia Salfia Faislabad, Jamia Salfia of Banaras, Deobandi Madrassas in Kohat and other Deobandi Madrassas in Pakistan are included.”⁽⁵³⁾

International associations like Rabeta Alam al Islami also add to the influence of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia also sponsors anti-Iranian efforts everywhere. The influence of Saudi Arabia wielded through various organizations and finances provided to affiliate organizations of Jama’at e Islami and research institute established by Jama’at e Islami have been documented in a number of research works. Qasim Zaman and Vali Reza have elaborated this influence quite a bit in their works.

References:

(1)    Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab disturbances of 1953—Govt. of Punjab Publications.

(2)    ibid

(3)    ibid

(4)    Tehreek e Khatm e Nabuvat Vol. 2 Chap. 4 Page 387-388—Aalmi Majlis e Tahafuz e Nabuvat, Huzuri Bagh Road, Multan.

(5)    David Commins—The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia; page 148—Published I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. London ISBN 1 84511 080 3

(6)    Johannes J. G. Jansen—the Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism—Hurst and Co. (Publishers) Ltd. London Page 34

(7)    Johannes J. G. Jansen—the Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism—Hurst and Co. (Publishers) Ltd. London Page 38

(8)    Ibid Page 38

(9)    Ibid Page 38

(10)  ibid Page 40

(11)  Natana J DeLong-Bas—Wahhabi Islam— I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. London Page 250—251

(12)  Ibid Page 250—251

(13)  Ibid Page 252

(14)  Johannes J. G. Jansen—the Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism—Hurst and Co. (Publishers) Ltd. London Page 33

(15)  Joseph E. B. Lumbard—Islam, Fundamentalism and the Betrayal of Tradition—THIRD EYE, Printed by Elegant Printers New Delhi Page 293

(16)  Ibid Page 293

(17)  Johannes J. G. Jansen—the Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism—Hurst and Co. (Publishers) Ltd. London Page 48

(18)  Johannes J. G. Jansen—the Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism—Hurst and Co. (Publishers) Ltd. London Page 49

(19)  Frederic Grare—Political Islam in the Subcontinent. The jamaat I Islami—Manohar the publication of a French research institute, India page 21

(20)  Khalil Ahmed Hamdi—Jada  o Manzil. Urdu translation of Ma’alim fi Tareeq, by Syed Qutub—introductory note  page 57

(21)  Abul Ala Maududi—Haqeeqat e Jihad, Lahore Taj Co. Ltd 1964 Page58

(22)  Abul Ala Maududi—Aljihad  fil Islam—Idara Tarjumanul Qur’aan (Pvt.) Ltd. Urdu Bazar Lahore, Page 173

(23)  Ibid  174

(24)  Ibid 174

(25)  Abul Ala Maududi—Haqeeqat e Jihad Lahore Taj Co. Ltd 1964 Page 64 (emphesis Added)

(26)  ibid Page 65

(27)  Abul Ala Maududi—Masala  i Qaumiyyat (Pathankot) Maktaba Jabat e Islami 1947 Page 105

(28)  Abul Ala Maududi—Haqiqat-e-Jihad, Page10-11

(29)  Vali Reza Nasr—Maududi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism—Oxford University Press, New York, Page 68

(30)  ibid Page 68

(31)  Abul Ala Maududi—Murtad ki Saza Islami Qanun Mein, Page 80—81

(32)  ibid 80—81

(33)  ibid Page 51

(34)  Abul Ala Maududi—Murtad ki Saza Islam Men Page 80—81?

(35)  Abul Ala Maududi—Murtad ki Saza Islami Qanun Men Page 32

(36)  ibid Page 35

(37)  Vali Reza Nasr—The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution, I.B. Torris & Company, London. Page 40.

(38)  Vali Reza Nasr—Maududi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism—Oxford University Press Newyork Page 69

(39)  Ibid Page 70

(40)  Ibid Page 71

(41)  Vali Reza Nasr—The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution I.B. Torris & Company London Page 221

(42)  Vali Reza Nasr—Maududi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism—Oxford University Press, New York, page 87

(43)  Vali Reza Nasr—Maududi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism—Oxford University Press, New York, page 75

(44)  Kalim Bahadur—The Jama’at I Islami of Pakistan—Progressive Books, Urdu Bazar Lahore—1983, page 205

(45)  ibid page 205

(46)  Frederic Grare—Political Islam in the Subcontinent. The Jamaat I Islami—Manohar the publication of a French research institute, India page 124

(47)  ibid page 124

(48)  ibid page 88

(49)  Vali Reza Nasr—The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution—I.B. Torris & Company London Page 60

(50)  Qasim Zaman—The Ulema in Contemporary Islam—Custodians of Change—Oxford University Press—Printed by Mas Printers Karachi Page 175

(51)  Ibid Page 175

(52)  Ibid Page 175

(53)  Ibid Page 175